DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

3 0 NOV 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

SUBJECT: DCID 1/7, Use of Control Markings

1. In response to your tasking of 14 September 1976 (SECOM-M-196), the subcommittee chairman appointed an Ad Hoc Working Group to discuss the problem of control marking proliferation and to recommend solutions for consideration by the members. The report of the Working Group was approved by all partici-pating members of the Compartmentation Subcommittee. It should be noted that SCI control markings were not considered and are not part of the recommendations.

2. The Subcommittee concludes that DCID 1/7, as written, provides adequate guidance.

3. Accordingly, the Subcommittee recommends that:

   a. The Security Committee advise all members of the intelligence community that they must review the control markings on all foreign intelligence documents for conformity with DCID 1/7 before they are released to other agencies and departments.

   b. The Security Committee inform all agencies and departments that intelligence community libraries will recognize only those control markings set forth in DCID 1/7.

   c. All agencies and departments of the intelligence community provide the Security Committee with copies of their DCID 1/7 implementation instructions. The name and telephone number of each agency's designated "primary referent," as requested in paragraph 6d of DCID 1/7, should also be provided.

4. Chairman's comment: A glossary of various internal agency caveats and markings, as an attachment to DCID 1/7, could serve the purpose of defining meanings and intent without requiring additional community markings.

Russell T. Newman
Chairman
Colonel, USAF

25X1

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM				
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DDI/SO	11-1-76	
2			
3	7C-35 HQS		
4			
5			
6			

ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Jack –

The attached memo and comments are self-explanatory –

Don

1-2: Copy sent to D/OS For dfp

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
C/AS/CILS	Nov-76

UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET

FORM NO. 237   Use previous editions   ☆USGPO: 1976 — 202-953   (40)
1-67

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DD/CRS		*eun*
2	D/CRS		*E*
3	C/AS	29 OCT 1976	
4	*Kelly should get copy to Gambino*		
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

In view of Betsy's last paragraph, perhaps a copy of the attached should be sent to Gambino who, I think, is the official CIA representative to the Security Committee.

Bob E.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/CH/DSG 1E4816 HQ.	28 OCT 1976

UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

25X1

FORM NO. 237   Use previous editions   (40)
1-67

26 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Reference Service

STAT

FROM : [   ]
Acting Chief, Document Services Branch

VIA : Chief, Document Services Group
Chief, Central Libraries Division

SUBJECT : Community Use of Dissemination Controls

REFERENCE : C/DSG's memorandum to Chairman, NFIB Security
Committee, dtd 2 July 1976

1. The NFIB Security Committee compartmentation Subcommittee
Ad Hoc Working Group, formed to examine the scope of the problem
relating to CRS concern over the Community use of dissemination
controls, held its first meeting on 19 October. In the absence of

STAT
the C/DSG, [   ] and I attended the meeting to answer
questions that might be raised.

2. Prior to the meeting I determined that the Working Group's
Chairman had not seen the referenced memorandum. I suggested it might
be beneficial to the committee if I brought reproduced copies to the
meeting. Once fully aware of the problem the Working Group was
immediately sympathetic to the situation. Several of those present
had participated in the preparation of DCID 1/7, Control of Dissemination
of Foreign Intelligence, dtd 5 October 1975. They were rather sur-
prised to discover that the DCID's implementation by various organiza-
tions had not followed the intent that the dissemination controls of
DCID 1/7 were to be the only controls used for community dissemination,
and any internal controls used within an Agency were to be ignored
once a document was released to another Agency. They were amazed that
the implementing instructions had obviously been unclear, but they
felt it would not be difficult to make the necessary clarification.
They never intended to transfer a classification burden to those con-
cerned with document indexing and retrieval. It became apparent that
some of the examples of the improper use of dissemination controls
could be traced to the delay in receipt of implementing instructions by
DoD components. Many felt these were one of a kind examples that were
not repeated once the instructions were known. There was general agree-
ment that the ORCON control was appropriate for many of the unique
Department of State controls that have caused so much confusion to the
Community.

SUBJECT: Community Use of Dissemination Controls

3. It looks like the Working Group will recommend the following:

--that the NFIB Security Committee put out a piece of
   paper indicating that only the DCID 1/7 dissemination
   controls apply and all others can be ignored

--that each intelligence agency submit its DCID 1/7
   implementing instructions to the NFIB Security
   Committee

These actions should place a limit so to speak on the number of
dissemination controls to be used in the Community and eliminate
the necessity to constantly modify codes used to represent these
controls in any automated data bases. When these steps are accom-
plished the problems that concerned CRS should be minimized. The
mood of the Working Group seemed to indicate that very little time
would be needed to make their recommendations.

4. The absence of any CIA representative on the Working Group
was both obvious and disappointing in view of the fact that a problem
surfaced by a CIA component was under consideration at the Community   STAT
level.